Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline, Chabahar, Iran, March 11, 2013. Vahid Salemi/Associated Press/Corbis
July 21, 2013
Officials from Iran and India came up with
an intriguing idea back in 1989: transporting Iranian natural gas to the
growing Indian market. As they began to explore the various options, the
officials decided to expand their dialogue to include Pakistan, with the notion
of constructing a pipeline that would carry the Iranian product both overland
to the Pakistani market and through Pakistan to India. The projected Iran-Pakistan-India
Pipeline (IPI) would stretch 1,724 miles, or 2,775 kilometers.
A decade after its
tumultuous revolution and only a year out of the brutal Iran-Iraq War, Iran
desperately needed investment in its energy infrastructure to help chart its
post-revolutionary future. The country was seeking to repair damage caused by
the war as well as finance new ventures. Iran hoped for an opportunity to
exploit its natural gas reserves—the world’s second largest. The mega-project
could spur economic prosperity in the provinces where the pipeline ran, and
becoming a major energy exporter beyond being merely an oil producer stood to
enhance Iran’s regional and global stature.1 The prospect of
supplying energy to two major markets just next door, both destined for economic
growth in the post-Cold War era, was an enticing one for Iran.
India and Pakistan, the energy needed to fuel economic growth projections could
not be provided by indigenous sources. Though both states had sought to
diversify their energy sources, with natural gas being a critical component of
their strategy, inadequate domestic reserves rendered those plans unviable
without foreign supplies. Thus, gaining almost exclusive access to Iran’s vast
gas reserves via the pipeline would go a long way toward buttressing
diversification and energy security. For its part, Pakistan had an additional
incentive; the lucrative revenues that would come from transit fees. Finally,
the economic integration inherent in the project offered the possibility of
improving strained India-Pakistan political relations. Hence, some dubbed the
IPI the “Peace Pipeline."
It seemed too good to
be true, and perhaps it was. Despite the obvious benefits of the IPI pipeline
to regional economic growth and political stability, the idea became ever more
deeply entangled in strategic contests, involving not only traditional regional
rivalries such as that between India and Pakistan, but the broader U.S.-Iran
conflict, which invariably draws in other countries. For much of the last
quarter century it appeared that, one way or the other, the pipeline would
become a casualty of geopolitics. Perhaps the biggest blow to the IPI pipeline
was the tightening of American unilateral and multilateral sanctions on Iran,
which would include punitive measures against India and Pakistan if they
pursued the project with Iran. Lately, however, the pipeline has been showing
new signs of life. Changing regional dynamics—most importantly, Russia’s entry
into pipeline deal making—have improved prospects for the IPI once again.
The Mumbai Factor
The longstanding animosity between India and
Pakistan worked against early success in the IPI negotiations. Pakistan also
had its differences with Iran, as the two countries were supporting opposite
sides in Afghanistan (Iran sustaining what became the Northern Alliance, and
Pakistan backing the Taliban in southern Afghanistan). The Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in 1990 altered geopolitical calculations for many nations concerning
energy security. For example, Iraq and Kuwait had together supplied two-thirds
of India’s oil imports, which were severely interrupted by the war.2
In 1993, India signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Iran for energy
cooperation, and began exploring pipeline options with other Persian Gulf
states as well. India had determined that the overland pipeline was the most
economically attractive and achievable option of natural gas sector cooperation
with Iran. Shipping liquefied natural gas (LNG) or constructing an underwater
pipeline between Iran and India were far more expensive alternatives. For Iran,
sanctions would make those options more difficult to achieve due to
difficulties finding external investment and expertise. In 1995, Pakistan
signed an agreement with Iran to actually begin the early phases of
constructing the overland pipeline. But an impediment arose when Pakistan
discovered new natural gas reserves, which temporarily cooled its desire for
At the beginning of the
2000s, the pendulum swung again. Pakistan realized that its indigenous natural
gas reserves were fundamentally inadequate for its growing domestic needs.
Unlike India, which had only begun to include natural gas in its national
energy mix, Pakistan had long utilized and depended upon natural gas. The rise
in oil and natural gas prices focused Indian and Pakistani decision makers on
the need for continual supply diversification in order to counteract the
steadily increasing costs of energy imports. So in 2003, Iran and Pakistan
established a Joint Working Group, and once again began discussing the
viability of the pipeline. The IPI project received another boost with the
thawing of Pakistan-India relations in the same year, enabling the two
countries to once again explore the possibility of energy cooperation and increased
trade. The new optimism did not last long. Three main factors worked to stall
progress once more: fundamental disagreements about pricing, concerns about
Pakistani border security, and the massive opposition to the pipeline by
regional and global stakeholders, most notably the United States.
a macro perspective, pricing differences could be expected, given that the
global gas market does not have the same pricing mechanisms as its oil
counterpart. A major sticking point during the negotiations involved the
question of periodic reviews of the projected twenty-five-year agreement.3
Based upon the particular price, and depending upon volatility, these periodic
reviews could be either advantageous or disadvantageous to either the producer
nation or the consumer nation. Finding the right balance was key, so that each
party felt that its economic interests were not being harmed.
In the IPI pipeline’s
case, several issues were at stake. Iran’s concern was the selling price, and
how to renegotiate prices based on fluctuations over time. Pakistan drove a
hard bargain over transit fees. And Pakistan and India both were concerned with
how the final price of natural gas would be quantified. Eventually, the Joint
Working Group had achieved much agreement. Even the thorny question of periodic
pricing reviews was resolved with an agreement to let future price changes be
decided by an independent arbiter.4
But by the time the
Joint Working Group had come to these agreements, other issues began to
intervene. From the start, border security, chiefly concerning Pakistan’s
Baluchistan province, was a major concern. As the IPI pipeline would traverse
through the center of this very restive province, apprehension over security
had always permeated discussions regarding the project. As the Pakistani
researcher Mehvish Nigar Qureshi has noted, the unequal distribution of revenue
generated from resources in Baluchistan had already added to local grievances.5
In the past, militant groups targeted both state institutions and gas
pipelines. And regional events, such as the U.S. invasion and occupation of
neighboring Afghanistan, as well as the projection of U.S. power in Pakistan
and the region generally, has only exacerbated the problem. Iran has thus been
concerned not only with how domestic instability in Pakistan would affect
pipeline security, but also whether U.S. opposition to the project might
eventually lead to American-inspired physical sabotage.
seemed to share Iran’s concerns. And, from the outset, Indian officials had
been wary of the Pakistani link in the pipeline; they worried that Islamabad
would be able to use the gas pipeline as a political weapon. Increasingly,
India fretted, too, about political instability in Pakistan, wondering if
Islamabad would retain the ability to guarantee the flow of energy supplies
through Baluchistan even if its intentions were to do so. The trepidations of
Iran and India eventually helped put the IPI pipeline idea in limbo.
progress on the pipeline and economic integration generally were the
traditional suspicions between India and Pakistan. Though chiefly related to
Kashmir, the instability in Afghanistan greatly contributed to another downward
trend in bilateral relations following the 2003 thaw. The Pakistani government
had long suspected that India might utilize its massive investments in
post-Taliban Afghanistan as leverage against Pakistan. And though Pakistan had
quickly sided with the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, it always had to balance
its relationship with the United States with practical considerations toward
its former Taliban clients—many of whom now resided in Pakistani territory.
Islamabad, in fact, never really committed to either side, but was always
hedging. The overt Indian support for the new political order in Afghanistan
contrasted with Islamabad’s deep mistrust for the Hamid Karzai government and
further strained the relationship between Pakistan and India. The strain was
evident in the weakening of anti-terrorism cooperation between the two
The Mumbai terrorist
attacks of 2008, carried out by the militant group Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT),
effectively paralyzed all economic cooperation between India and Pakistan—and
undermined potential future progress on the IPI pipeline. Though there has been
no verifiable evidence of direct knowledge, involvement, or assistance by the
former administration of President Asif Zardari of Pakistan in the Mumbai
terror attacks, LeT’s open presence within the country—particularly the freedom
of movement it had enjoyed and possible links to the country’s intelligence
service—has enraged India. India formally withdrew from the project a few
months later, bringing the feasibility of the IPI pipeline, some twenty years
after the idea was first launched, into serious doubt.
For American strategic thinking, progress on
the IPI pipeline would be a major setback for its sanctions policy against
Iran. It would produce a significant precedent of open defiance to the U.S.-led
sanctions. But more significantly, it would create conditions where America’s
sanctions policy would be eroded by the economic dependence of Pakistan and
India on Iranian natural gas.
The systematic overt
and covert opposition of the United States and its allies had long been seen as
the greatest hurdle to the completion of the IPI pipeline. Due to primarily
U.S. sanctions against Iran—a staple of American policy towards the country
since the Iranian Revolution—any nation that conducted major economic
transactions with the Islamic Republic risked severe punitive measures. Since
1996, under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, later called the Iran Sanctions Act,
American sanctions had taken the form of extraterritoriality, by which
Washington would impose unilateral sanctions on third parties that interacted
Yet, from Washington’s
standpoint, while the threat of sanctions on Pakistan and India did help delay
the pipeline, they were not enough to affect the fundamental policy
calculations in Islamabad and New Delhi on the feasibility of the project.
Thus, Washington needed to offer inducements as well.
In May 2008, the
Heritage Foundation released “The Proposed Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline: An
Unacceptable Risk to Regional Security,” which provided a clear look at what
had already become a bipartisan American policy.6 On publication,
many of the recommendations that the Heritage Foundation made were already
visibly underway. However, the report was significant in that it spelled out an
integrated approach, which included changing the domestic and regional
conditions that had combined to make the IPI pipeline a potentially viable
The report’s main
—Stepping up U.S. energy diplomacy to discourage pursuit of the
pipeline, including bilateral dialogue with India and Pakistan.
—Encouraging greater LNG capacity in India and Pakistan.
—Supporting the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline as an alternative to the IPI pipeline.
—Expanding energy cooperation with India within the framework of
the Asia-Pacific Partnership.
—Pursuing U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation.
—Assisting Pakistan in building large-scale hydroelectric
projects, and LNG terminals to meet its growing energyand electricity demand.
Foundation’s advocacy boiled down to mass public diplomacy against the IPI
pipeline, the encouragement of LNG transport (which is markedly more expensive
than pipelines) and other alternative sources of energy, and the bolstering of
nuclear cooperation with India and Pakistan—for energy generation purposes.
Basically, diplomacy pursued in conjunction with the latent threat of sanctions
against both nations if they chose to move ahead with Iran on the IPI pipeline.
The American approach
enjoyed a good degree of success. Washington signed a deal in 2005 to support
the Indian government’s surging power needs via the construction of civilian
nuclear power plants. The deal was met with stiff resistance from many domestic
critics in India, and greeted with alarm by some American critics. Indian
skeptics saw an affront to Indian sovereignty; under the accord, India had to
separate its nuclear program into civilian and military components, and make
the civilian part accessible for international inspections.7 But
within three years the accord passed through the maze of bureaucracy—the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S. Congress, and the Indian
parliament—and came into force in October 2008. It was hoped that the deal
would serve as a useful precedent for non-proliferation policy, and increase
the percentage of India’s nuclear-generated electricity capacity, which the
International Energy Agency (IEA) put at a mere 0.7 percent in 2009.
Meanwhile, and in line
with U.S. strategy, India increased its LNG imports from 3.49 billion cubic
meters (bcm) in 2004−05 to 12.31 bcm in 2009−10.8 Most of the
additional LNG came from Qatar, an American ally—again in line with the policy
of expanding U.S.-India energy cooperation to develop and disseminate
technologies within the framework of the Asia-Pacific Partnership.
India had begun to see
that the geopolitical disadvantages of the IPI pipeline were now outweighing
the potential economic benefits of the project. A deterioration of
Indian-Iranian relations became a factor in India’s decision to withdraw from
the IPI project. New Delhi was influenced by its growing relationship with
various states that have antagonistic relations with Iran, specifically some
Arab countries in the Gulf, and Israel. Saudi Arabia in particular had long pressed
India to limit its economic ties with Iran, and rely on the Arab Gulf states
for more of its hydrocarbon imports. The relationship between India and Israel
had evolved from simple economic ties to a burgeoning defense and intelligence
sharing relationship. Some Indian policy analysts came to doubt the very
concept and potential of strategic Iran-India ties, arguing that interaction
between New Delhi and Tehran had become mostly on a case-by-case basis.9
Some believe that Indian officials must have shared Washington’s concerns about
Iran, noting that energy security is too vital for India to have scrapped the
IPI project solely due to American pressure.10 For its part, Iran grew increasingly
suspicious of India, with Iranian analysts perceiving that India had simply
played the “Iran card” to exact concessions from the West.11
Pakistan, however, saw
things differently. It did not have the same policy flexibility as India, due
to Islamabad’s reliance on natural gas—in 2009, according to the IEA, it
accounted for 31.9 percent of Pakistan’s energy basket. Moreover, deteriorating
relations with Washington over suspicions of Pakistani collusion with the
Taliban and its allies further undermined prospects for U.S.-Pakistan energy
Pakistan had long attempted
to obtain external investors for the IPI pipeline. Major foreign energy
companies, such as Malaysia’s Petronas, Royal Dutch Shell, France’s Total, and
Australia’s BHP, had expressed interest in a consortium to fund the huge
endeavor. But with escalation of U.S. pressure, these firms gradually walked
back their interest. Although Iran had begun construction of the pipeline on
its territory, India’s exit from the project essentially reduced it to an
Iran-Pakistan venture. Due to investment concerns, and Pakistan’s domestic
economic deterioration, even Pakistan’s involvement was in doubt. The “Peace
Pipeline” seemed doomed.
Russia to the Rescue?
In the last few years,
however, a series of seemingly disconnected events and trends have created
conditions in which the IPI pipeline has once again become a viable option.
Due to the extreme
imbalance of power in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, Pakistan was highly
vulnerable to American pressure. After the Indian exit from the IPI project,
Washington began to publicly and forcefully ask Pakistan to formally withdraw
from the project as well, and accept some of the inducements India had been
given. After the Obama administration’s intensification of sanctions, Riyadh
also openly pushed Islamabad to ditch its project with Iran. Washington’s
strategy was essentially to publicly force Islamabad to adopt its policy
But the ensuing
deterioration in U.S.-Pakistan relations halted any real progress towards
energy cooperation, forcing Pakistan to think again about the eventual
prospects for the IPI pipeline. Though Pakistan had enlisted as an ally in the
American war on terror, its relationship with Washington significantly worsened
in 2011 after the killing of Osama Bin Laden in an American military raid on
the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. This episode triggered extreme anger and
mistrust on both sides. The Americans felt betrayed, having provided Pakistani
security forces with billions of dollars for anti-terror cooperation only to
discover that Bin Laden was hiding out in Pakistan right under their noses;
Pakistan, for its part, was humiliated by the raid’s violation of its
sovereignty. Intermittent U.S. drone strikes into Pakistan against suspected
Taliban targets still add to the embarrassment felt by the country’s political
elite and to the fury felt by the general population.
The important new
variable in favor of the IPI pipeline was the entry of Russia into the deal.
Moscow’s interest had an economic and strategic rationale that predated the
events that led to the project’s collapse in 2009. Russia possesses the world’s
largest reserves of natural gas, with Iran holding the second largest reserves.
As the Turkish scholar Bezen Coşkun
has highlighted, Russia is keen to protect the primacy of Russian natural gas
in the European energy market—a Russian vital interest—to the extent of
ensuring that Iran is neutralized as a potential competitor in the future.12 Iran has shown interest in joining the
Turkey-Austria pipeline, known as the Nabucco project, and presents itself to
Europe as an alternative to Russia as a natural gas supplier.13
Russia’s involvement in
the IPI pipeline makes good strategic sense. It would help steer Iranian gas
exports away from European consumers, thus strengthening Russia’s leverage in
the European market.14 And by joining the IPI project, Moscow could
become an indispensable partner with three major regional players: Iran,
Pakistan, and India. Once again, Russia can deal with—and control—potential
energy rivals through cooperation.15
In early 2012, Pakistan
formally reached out to Russia to secure finances for the IPI pipeline. Russia
in turn requested that Pakistan award Gazprom, the Russian energy giant, a
non-bid $1.2 billion slice of the pipeline-laying contract.16 The
move would give Russia an exclusive position in the construction of the
pipeline in Pakistan, and a significant stake in the overall IPI enterprise.
The prospects for reviving the pipeline were further aided by the completion of
the Iranian portion of the pipeline up to the Pakistani border, inaugurated by
the heads of state of both countries in March 2013. These developments have
inspired Pakistan to take a more defiant posture against the threat of U.S.
sanctions, publicly projecting that its portion of the pipeline would be
finished by December 2014.
Add to the mix that
Washington had proved unable to sponsor meaningful alternatives that would
fundamentally change the energy equations for the better in Pakistan or in
India. For example, as part of its energy diplomacy, the United States pushed
the proposed Trans-Afghanistan pipeline (TAPI) as an alternative to the IPI
pipeline. But the venture has questionable feasibility in at least the foreseeable
future. India would have the same concerns about Pakistan as the transit
country; the persistent security problems inside Afghanistan—the country
remains an active war zone, with U.S. troops due to withdraw in 2014—make the
project implausible in the near term.
The United States has
experienced mixed results from its energy diplomacy. While security issues have
paralyzed energy cooperation with Pakistan, political problems have undermined
the potential for U.S.-India cooperation. The much-heralded nuclear cooperation
has seen few tangible benefits, remaining largely stagnant since 2009. Lisa
Curtis, a co-author of the Heritage Foundation report, says that an important
problem is the Indian parliament’s move to virtually shut out American companies
from India’s civil nuclear industry.17 Another hurdle for India’s
nuclear program is the galvanizing of anti-nuclear activists in the country
after the nuclear power disaster in Fukushima, Japan.18
The most successful
element of American policy has been the growth of LNG in the Indian energy
market, which has given India a modest degree of diversification. But LNG has
not fundamentally addressed India’s mounting energy problems. It is impractical
for India to depend on exports of LNG from the United States, and the utility
of LNG imports generally depends on factors outside India’s control, such as
the global price. A realization has begun to dawn in India that New Delhi is
paying a high price by opting out of the IPI pipeline.
This was dramatically
brought home by the sweltering summer days of July 2012, when India experienced
the biggest systematic power outage in recorded history. The outage affected
twenty of the country’s twenty-eight provinces, cutting off electricity to some
700 million people and causing large chunks of the economy to grind to a halt.
While the exact causes of the blackout remain contested, the broad consensus is
that the hydroelectric component of India’s electricity generation, which
contributes roughly 19 percent to the country’s electricity consumption,
severely dropped production due to unexpected low rainfall from a weak monsoon
season. The episode once again highlighted India’s lack of sufficient energy
diversification—an imbalance that has not been rectified by inducements such as
the U.S.-India nuclear deal or the increase in LNG imports. India, in other
words, remains in search of a comprehensive solution to its energy needs. In
Pakistan, meanwhile, the energy crisis has evolved into a threat to the
government, compounding the security, demographic, social, and economic
problems that the country faces.
Mills, an energy consultant and author of Capturing Carbon: The New Weapon in the War
Against Climate Change, has argued that domestic energy restructuring would go a long way in
both Pakistan’s and India’s quests for greater energy security.19
This would entail addressing consumer payment delinquencies and electricity
theft, reducing subsidies, improving the climate for investment in offshore and
shale gas, and broadening the use of solar and wind power.20 Yet, considering the sheer amount of time
that would take Pakistan and India to implement such measures and the growth
trajectories of both economies, it is difficult to see how they will manage to
feed their energy needs without a substantial outside source of energy that
would fundamentally alter, for the better, their quest for continued supply
diversification. It has been this very calculation that has always kept the IPI
project alive, albeit at times in hibernation.
Diminishing American Influence
The IPI pipeline is like a chain; it has
many links. For it to properly function, all the links need to withstand the
pressures that could make them snap. The pressures remain in force. But due to
domestic and regional factors, these links are strengthening in ways we have
not seen before, thus giving the IPI pipeline a second chance.
With the Iranian
section completed, Gazprom’s entry into the scheme as a major investor makes
Pakistan the country to watch. The ability and willingness of Pakistan to buck
outside opposition and forge ahead with construction will be crucial. Russia’s
role will be critical as well: Will Moscow follow through with the Gazprom
investment? Or will it play the “Pakistan card” as leverage in its complex
geopolitical dealings with Washington?
The importance of the
pipeline—as a major engine of economic growth, and to promote political and
strategic interdependence in the subcontinent—will ultimately depend on India.
Many Indian policy analysts now see India becoming more independent in its
energy policy, in part due to a perception of diminishing American influence in
the region. The United States, thanks to development of new energy resources in
North America, is becoming less reliant on conventional supplies from the
Persian Gulf. In turn, Gulf energy resources are becoming a greater factor for
Asian nations, notably India and China. This leads to a conclusion that India
has sufficient incentive to assert the independence of India’s foreign policy and
defy the threat of American sanctions over the IPI pipeline.21 To
India, the IPI pipeline is evolving from being a potentially critical part of
its energy diversification policy to a component of India’s larger geostrategic
interests. If the pipeline’s construction within Pakistan penetrates all the
way to the Indian border, as it was originally planned to do, an energy-needy
India may be hard pressed to ignore it.
Reza Sanati is a research fellow in the Middle East Studies Center at Florida
International University in Miami. He has contributed to Alternatives: Turkish
Journal of International Relations, Christian
National Interest, PBS, and Al-Monitor, among others. On Twitter: @rzsanati.
1 Nadeem Shahryar and Timothy Boon von
Ochssée, “The Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline Project: Cross-Border Gas Pipeline
Challenges,” IGU Magazine (April 2009).
Temple, “The Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline: The Intersection of Energy and
(New Delhi, India: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, April 2007): 6.
Maleki, “Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline:,” MIT
Center for International Studies Audit of the Conventional Wisdom (September 2007).
4 Anoop Singh, “The Economics of
Iran-Pakistan-India Natural Gas Pipeline,” Economic and Political Weekly 43, no. 37 (September 13, 2008).
5 Mehvish Nigar Qureshi, “Energy Crisis in
Pakistan: A Threat to National Security,” Issra Papers 2009,
ed. Major General Azhar Ali Shah (Islamabad: Institute for Strategic Studies,
Research, and Analysis [ISSRA], National Defence University 2009).
6 Ariel Cohen, Lisa Curtis, and Owen Graham,
“The Proposed Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline: An Unacceptable Risk to
Regional Security,” (The Heritage Foundation, May 30, 2008): 13-14.
7 Ramesh Phadke, “India Should Beware of U.S.
Motives on Nuclear Deal,” (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, May 3,
8 Ann-Sophie Corbeau, “Natural Gas in India,”
(Paris, France: International Energy Agency, 2010): 31.
9 Harsh V. Pant, “India’s Relations with Iran:
Much Ado about Nothing,” The Washington
Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2011).
10 Uma Purushothaman, “American Shadow over
India-Iran Relations,” Strategic
Analysis 36, no. 6 (2012).
11 Maleki, “Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline.”
12 Bezen Balamir Coşkun, “Global Energy Geopolitics and Iran,” Uluslararası İlişkiler 5, no. 20 (Winter 2009): 186.
13 Nikolay Kozhanov, “Russia’s Relations with
Iran: Dialogue without Commitments,” (The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, June 2012): 24.
14 Coşkun, “Global Energy Geopolitics and Iran,” 186.
15 Coşkun, “Global Energy Geopolitics and Iran,” 186.
16 Agha Iqrar Haroon, “Iran and Pakistan Keep
Working on IPI Gas Pipeline Project,” Tehran
Times (August 8, 2012). http://www.tehrantimes.com/economy-and-business/100399-iran-and-pakistan-keep-working-on-ipi-gas-pipeline-project
17 Lisa Curtis, “Going the Extra Mile for a
Strategic U.S.-India Relationship,” (Heritage Foundation August 20, 2012), 1̲7.
18 Curtis, “Going the Extra Mile for a Strategic
U.S.-India Relationship,” 1̲7.
19 Unpublished Interview: Robin Mills. Interview
by Reza Sanati, May 18, 2013.
21 P. R. Kumaraswamy, “India’s Iran
Defiance,” IDSA Comment (New Delhi, India Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,
March 19, 2012).