Campaign posters for Islamist presidential candidate Mohammed Morsi, Cairo, May 24, 2012. Scott MacLeod for the Cairo Review.
How Egypt’s Islamists Lost the First Round
June 02, 2012
Let’s do the math.
According to the preliminary results of
Egypt’s presidential poll, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)
candidate Mohammed Morsi picked up 5,578,760 votes, around 25 percent, followed
by Mubarak-era minister and PM Ahmed Shafik with 5,333,84, 24 percent. In a
surprise showing, Nasserist Hamdeen Sabahi was next with 4,670,939 votes, 21
percent. Trailing were two former leading candidates, ex-Muslim Brotherhood leader
Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh with 3,919,727, 18 percent, and in a distant fifth
place, former Arab League secretary general and Mubarak-era Foreign Minister Amr
Moussa at 2,391,214, or 11 percent.
If we divide the top five candidates
into Islamists and non-Islamists, the simple calculation reveals that Islamists
Morsi and Aboul Fotouh secured 43 percent of the vote, a mammoth 13 percent
less than the total percentage of votes gained by the three non-Islamist
candidates, who combined, received around 56 percent of the vote.
Compare that to the Islamist victory in
the parliamentary election recorded in January. The FJP-dominated Democratic
Alliance alone picked up around 47 percent of People’s Assembly seats in a poll
where voter turnout was around 54 percent, at least 10 percent higher than in
the presidential election.
In terms of the number of votes, while
the FJP raked in some 13 million votes in the parliamentary election, that
number crashed down to 5.5 million in the presidential race. Even if we add Aboul
Fotouh’s votes to the mix, the number still barely reaches 9.4 million votes, down
by a staggering 3.6 million from those who voted Islamist less than six months
Despite their massive organizational
machine, Morsi struggled to make it to the runoff, betraying rising
disillusionment with the FJP and the Islamist discourse in general.
The 56 percent who voted non-Islamist had
one common denominator: their absolute resolve not to see the FJP candidate in
the presidential office. This was a manifestation of their unequivocal
objection to the fact that the FJP seeks to dominate the political arena, with a
significant block in parliament and possibly a leading voice in the
controversial constituent assembly tasked with writing the new constitution.
While it’s understandable that voters,
disillusioned and fearful of Islamist hegemony, would choose to support another
icon of the revolution like Hamdeen Sabahi, the reason why the runoff will most
likely end up between the two polar extremes Morsi and Shafiq, is that
Egyptians have proven that they are still trapped in the anti-Islamist rhetoric
of the Mubarak era. These results have taken us back to square one when many
may find themselves forced to plug their ears and noses to give their protest
vote to the FJP, just like the old days.
The fear of
Islamists is so deeply entrenched in the Egyptian psyche that it has
obliterated the memory of the revolution’s martyrs. In a way, the shocking
support for Shafik betrays a level of ethical and moral bankruptcy that
surpasses mere political illiteracy. Shafik’s rise from
the ashes of the martyrs was only made possible with the backing of the
disbanded National Democratic Party whose patronage system is alive and well. His
veiled threat to clamp down on both the Islamists and the revolutionaries was
the war cry for the counter-revolutionaries, headed by the Supreme Council of
the Armed Forces, which has been preparing for this moment since February 12,
Some so-called liberal intellectuals
and politicians, with their phobic attitude towards the Islamists, also helped
create the vacuum filled by Shafik. Their fear of an illusive theocracy, which
they consistently pitted against the equally illusive notion of a “civil
state,” has overlooked the biggest threat of all to the rise of democracy in
this country: military rule.
Egypt’s Islamists, the FJP in
particular, have made grave mistakes. Their abysmal performance at the polls
and in parliament, which proves beyond a doubt how their street credence has
plunged, must force them to make serious concessions to save the revolution
from the grip of an electoral ‘naksa’ (crisis), a setback to the worst days of
the Mubarak era, but alas this time supported by the legitimacy of free and
The Islamists must reach immediate
consensus with other political forces over the formation of the constituent
assembly mandated to draft a new constitution, an issue of vital importance
that faded from public attention during the presidential election but witnesses
major conflicts in parliament. Agreement to offer Sabahi the position of prime
minister with a solid executive mandate will be essential to the creation of a
strong, representative pro-revolutionary front. Islamists’ failure to reach
such consensus will be the last nail in their coffin. They will lose the
presidency to Shafik, whose first decision will be to dissolve parliament.
And with that Egypt will have come full
Al Malky is a Cairo-based columnist and the former chief editor of the Daily